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Using resources: 
Conceptualising the mediation and reflective use of tools and signs 
 
The idea that culture comprises resources which are used has become a 
popular means to re-conceptualise the culture-agency antinomy. However, 
the theorisation of using resources is fragmented. The present article reviews 
several attempts to theorise resources, arguing that there has been too much 
focus upon the resources themselves while the notion of use has been 
neglected. Focusing upon mode of use, as opposed to the resources used, 
the article underscores the importance of distinguishing between tools, which 
are used to act upon the world, and signs, which are used to act upon the 
mind. The article also argues for a distinction between non-reflective use, or 
mediation, and reflective use of resources. Future research should focus upon 
the transformation of tools into signs and the transformation of mediation into 
reflective use. The article concludes by discussing problematic issues which 
remain in conceptualising the use of resources.  
 
Keywords: tools, signs, mediation, reflection, resources, use 
 
 3 
 
Using resources: 
Conceptualising the mediation and reflective use of tools and signs 
 
It is now widely accepted that creating an opposition between agency 
and culture is unproductive. Previously culture had often been conceptualised 
as a force external to the individual. Hegemonic norms, socialisation 
practices, institutions, collective representations and discourses were 
conceptualised as coercive and deterministic. Indeed, implicitly it often 
seemed as if only an individual outside of culture could be fully independent. 
However, more recently in anthropology (Bourdieu, 1990), sociology 
(Giddens, 1986) and psychology (Valsiner, 1987) there has been a move to 
conceptualise individual agency as culturally constituted: people do not act 
against culture, rather they act through culture. A child growing up alone on 
the proverbial desert island is not free, but rather is enslaved by basic 
instincts. Culture enables distanciation from the environment, and thus self-
regulation, planning and creative action. 
At the core of this re-conceptualisation are new words to describe 
culture in terms of resources, tools, artifacts, capital and semiotic mediators. 
Although each of these terms has its own context of use, they all imply that 
culture is used. Things become resources, tools, artifacts, capital or semiotic 
mediators through being used in the course of human action. The 
etymological origin of the term resource comes from Latin resurgere, meaning 
to splash back, resuscitate or rise again. In the face of a rupture or great 
need, a resource enables adaptation and restoration. It is this embeddedness 
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in a ruptured goal oriented and meaningful activity which give the terms 
resource, tool, artifact, capital, mediator and semiotic mediator their particular 
value. Each of these terms denote something akin to a resource, namely, 
something which does not exist in itself but which comes into existence by 
enabling meaningful human activity. 
Examples of using resources abound. Vygotsky (1978, p. 51) provides 
one of the classic examples in his discussion of using a knot in a handkerchief 
as a mnemonic aid. Since then, the same idea has been applied to the use of 
an abacus as either an external aid or an intra-psychological representation to 
aid thought (Cole & Derry, 2005), to the study of heuristics, mental strategies 
and rules of thumb (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999), and the use of stickers, post-it 
notes and other memory aids by people with declining cognitive faculties 
(Baltes, 1997). In the field of development, the concept of resources has 
proved popular (Arievitch & Stetsenko, 2000; Neuman & Bakeman, 2001). 
Children use transitional objects as emotional resources (Winnicott, 1968), 
argumentative styles as rhetorical resources (Psaltis & Duveen, 2006) and 
fingers, calendars, and arithmetic as resources to mark time (Wyndhamn & 
Säljö, 1999). In the field of education, there have been studies on how 
education guards access to resources (Bourdieu, 1986) and how certain 
resources are needed even to participate in education (Rochex, 1998). 
Outside of the educational frame, religious fables, traditional stories, films and 
pop songs can all provide resources for dealing with life’s problems, from 
naming a child (Zittoun, 2004a) to adapting to war (Zittoun, Gillespie, Cornish 
& Aveling, 2008). Soldiers (Hale, 2008) and migrants (Markovitzky & Mosek, 
2006) use personal artifacts from home as resources for identity and memory, 
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and communities and nations use memorials to achieve a similar end 
(Wertsch, 2002; Zittoun, 2004b). While we can take heart in the breadth of 
contexts in which the re-conceptualisation of culture is taking hold, and with it, 
the notion of resource, this very breadth is also a cause for concern. Do 
people use language (Austin, 1962) in the same way as they use tourist 
guidebooks (Gillespie, 2006)? Is the mediation provided by a pole-vaulting 
pole (Wertsch, 1995) equivalent to the mediation provided by religion (Belzen, 
1999)? 
Moving beyond the antinomy between personal agency and culture is a 
paradigm shift which is still in its early stages and as such there is 
considerable volatility in the terminology and conceptualisation. The terms 
resource, artifact, capital, tool, mediator, and semiotic resource are 
overlapping and polysemic. The problem is that with too much polysemy, 
there is little consolidation and advancement of the field (Witherington, 2007; 
Zittoun, Gillespie & Cornish, 2009). 
The aim of the present article is to review conceptualisations of using 
resources. We begin by reviewing efforts in the social sciences broadly 
conceived, and then hone in on the unique contribution of cultural psychology. 
In each case we review the main conceptual distinctions which have been 
made. We argue that the majority of these conceptualisations have concerned 
themselves with distinguishing cultural elements, and that theorisation of the 
way cultural elements are used has been neglected. Accordingly, we focus 
upon the process of use rather than the resources used and outline two 
distinctions. First, we distinguish using a resource to act upon the world (tool), 
from acting upon the mind of self or other (sign). Second, we distinguish non-
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reflective use (mediation) from reflective awareness of the resource being 
used (reflective use). Future research, we argue, should focus upon the 
transformations between tools and signs, and between mediation and 
reflective use. The article concludes by discussing some of the outstanding 
problems in conceptualising the use of resources. 
 
Re-conceptualising culture in social science 
 
Bourdieu (1986) has been at the forefront of re-conceptualising the 
individual-culture relation in the social sciences. He distinguishes between 
economic, cultural, symbolic, and social resources. Economic resources 
include wealth and access to credit. Cultural resources refer to the skills, 
knowledge and experience of an individual which tends to be cultivated by 
parents and educational institutions. Symbolic capital is a resource in the 
sense that high status and prestige gives legitimacy and can enable certain 
forms of action (e.g., titles, degrees and awards). Finally, personal 
connections and institutional contacts can be drawn upon as social resources 
for getting things done.  
According to Bourdieu these resources can be accumulated as capital. 
In the same way that economic capital can be exchanged for commodities 
and services, so exchanges are possible between these forms of capital. 
Economic resources can be used to cultivate and obtain social connections, 
to purchase education and thus cultural capital, or to acquire prestige. 
Equally, social, cultural and symbolic resources can be used to facilitate the 
accumulation of economic capital.  
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Agency within Bourdieu’s scheme is culturally constituted. Cultural 
capital, for example, constitutes the habitus of the individual providing a 
platform for action, while economic and social capital can enable certain paths 
of action. However, Bourdieu’s focus is not upon the active individual. Rather, 
the focus is upon the way in which capital accumulates and social structures 
such as class are perpetuated. The emphasis is on the way in which the 
socially constituted habitus, access to resources, and the resources 
themselves are constraining rather than enabling. In this sense, Bourdieu has 
a theoretical structure which conceptually transcends the culture-agency 
antinomy, though in practice he focuses upon the cultural and structural side 
of the antinomy with little direct theorisation of the way in which resources are 
woven into activity. 
Other scholars in the social sciences, such as Swidler (1986), have 
been more focused upon the way in which resources are actually used. 
Developing from Bourdieu, Swidler argues for a conceptualisation of culture 
as a “‘tool kit’ of symbols, stories, rituals and world-views, which people might 
use to solve different kinds of problems” (Swidler, 1986, p. 273). These can 
often be very contradictory and do not necessarily lead to simple clear-cut 
paths of action. For example, the Bible is full of contradictory messages and 
as such does not prescribe a monological and internally consistent way of life. 
For Swidler, the Bible presents an open-ended range of meanings, some of 
which may resonate with the reader and thus be appropriated and woven as 
resources into the reader’s path of action. 
Swidler emphasises the creativity with which individuals use cultural 
resources. “A crucial task for research” she argues “is to understand how 
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cultural capacities created in one historical context are re-appropriated and 
altered in new circumstances (Swidler, 1986, p. 283). The point is that culture 
may provide resources for human action, but exactly what constitutes as a 
resource, and what it is used for, remains open. Cultural artifacts created in 
one context can be used creatively in a second context. In order to 
understand this process, Swidler (1986, p. 284) argues, researchers need to 
focus upon “how culture is used by actors” and “how cultural elements 
constrain or facilitate patterns of action.” 
In her analysis of the culture which exists in society, Swidler proposes 
that it can be conceptualised as existing on a continuum from ideology to 
tradition to common sense. The continuum is from highly articulated and self-
justifying belief and ritual systems (ideologies), to partially articulated beliefs 
and practices (traditions), to completely transparent and taken-for-granted 
cultural knowledge (common sense). Common sense is taken-for-granted in 
the sense of seeming to be a natural aspect of the world which needs no 
justification. 
Swidler elaborates this distinction, by further suggesting that during 
settled periods, culture tends to exist as common sense. During such times 
people unquestioningly use the cultural tools and that use in turn reinforces 
ethos or values of the culture. In contrast, during unsettled times both cultural 
ends and values are questioned. During such periods culture needs to be 
justified and accordingly it becomes discursively elaborated and thematised 
(Marková, 2003). As the pattern of life becomes de-stabilised, so the culture 
which supports, canalises, and reproduces that pattern of life needs to 
become articulated as a self-justifying ideology.  
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There are similarities between Swidler’s presentation and the ideas 
developed by Moscovici (1974/2008). Moscovici has revived Durkheim’s 
concept of collective representations, but has developed it in a more 
psychological direction. Contemporary societies are too heterogeneous to 
support genuinely collective representations, Moscovici argues. Rather, 
alternative and sometimes conflictual representations co-exist (Gillespie, 
2008). Such representations Moscovici calls social representations. Like 
Swidler’s concept of ideology, social representations exist in a heterogeneous 
field of representations and thus often have to become self-conscious in a 
discursive sense. The representations become self-justifying – what 
Moscovici calls polemical representations. A second similarity concerns the 
role of representations as resources for action. Like Swidler, Moscovici’s 
focus is upon the use of knowledge within everyday life and especially how it 
is appropriated from one context and used in a second. 
Despite calls by Swidler to study ‘how culture is used by actors,’ and 
Moscovici’s encouragement to psychologists to incorporate sociological 
theory, social scientific theorising of resources tends to underplay agency. For 
example, the concept of resource is repeatedly linked to preserving social 
hierarchies. Instead of studying education in terms of enablement, it is studied 
in terms of constraint. Educational institutions, family traditions, and social 
networks control access to the exclusive resources which enable high 
achievement (Farkas, Grobe, Sheenhan & Shuan, 1990). Although important, 
such research has a tendency to once again undermine agency, and to fall 
back into the traditional forms of cultural or sociological determinism.  
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The problem is partially disciplinary. The culture-agency antinomy 
spans sociological (i.e., culture) and psychological (i.e., agency) levels of 
analysis. The problem is compounded by the fact that the sociological level of 
analysis was born out of a rejection of the psychological level (Durkheim, 
1898). Since then, any attempts to explain sociological phenomena in terms 
of psychology have been labelled ‘psychologism’ and resisted with all the 
motivation that an ontological threat to the discipline can unleash (Moscovici, 
1993). Upon these fractured foundations it is almost impossible to build a 
nuanced theory of how cultural resources are used. Any theory needs to be 
both sociological or cultural, and psychological. Cultural psychology presents 
one such approach. 
 
Cultural psychological approach to resources 
 
The idea that culture mediates and enables human activity has been a 
central tenet of the cultural psychological approach since the work of Dewey 
(1896), Janet (1934) and Vygotsky (1978). What these and other ancestors 
have bequeathed contemporary cultural psychology is a commitment to a unit 
of analysis which entwines the individual actor and culture into one model. 
The ‘unit of analysis’ in cultural psychology has been conceptualised in terms 
of ‘acting-with-mediational-means’ (Wertsch, 1995), ‘activity’ (Leontiev, 1979), 
‘symbolic action’ (Boesch, 1991), mediation within ‘activity systems’ 
(Engeström, 1999), mediation within transitions (Zittoun, 2006a), mediation 
within ‘social acts’ (Gillespie, 2005) and many more (see Matusov, 2007). 
These units of analysis are distinctive because they are focused upon 
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individual action with cultural means, and as such these models span both 
psychological and sociological dimensions of the problematic.  
A second defining feature of cultural psychology concerns the 
emphasis on creative action, also mentioned by Swidler. Instead of simply 
‘using’ resources, actors within this tradition are often described as “poaching” 
or “renting” (Wertsch, 1998, p. 145), and as “appropriating” (Rogoff, 1995, p. 
150), and “hi-jacking” (Perriault, 1989, p. 155). Using culture implies novelty. 
This novelty is not merely restricted to the moment of use, it can feed back 
into the resource itself. Resources are ‘marked’ by creative use and carry this 
history into the future. Examples of creative appropriation, which have left 
their trace, include using the telephone and instant text messaging for social 
communication. Instead of resisting these creative dynamics of appropriation, 
there is now a move to encourage and incorporate these dynamics into the 
development of new technologies (Hyysalo, 2004). 
Despite these two common features, cultural psychological research is 
actually quite heterogeneous. Different sub-traditions have conceptualised the 
use of resources in different ways. In the following we present three influential 
distinctions, namely, between cultural and natural resources, between 
instrumental and consumptive objects, and between primary, secondary and 
tertiary artifacts. 
The distinction between natural and cultural resources has been 
espoused by Baltes and his colleagues. For Baltes (1997), lifespan 
development comprises three basic processes: selection of goals, 
optimisation of the resources, and compensation for the loss of natural 
resources. The notion of resource designates any means to achieve the 
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selected goals. Compensation for the loss of natural physical and cognitive 
ability, for example due to aging, entails using new resources, optimising 
existing resources or changing one’s goals (Baltes, Lindenberger & 
Staudinger, 1998). Cultural resources are diverse, including cognitive skills, 
motivational dispositions, socialization strategies, physical structures, 
economics and medical procedures. Examples of compensation include 
Michael Jordan relying on special footwear to compensate for a foot injury and 
Marie Curie asking colleagues for help. Whether cultural resources are 
technologies, people, books or heuristics is not the main issue. The key point 
is that cultural resources compensate for deficient natural resources. 
Symbolic Action Theory also gives a central place to goals and 
conceives of culture as enabling goal achievement. However, instead of 
distinguishing resources on the basis of being natural or cultural, Boesch 
(1991) distinguishes them in terms of the goal being achieved. Specifically, he 
distinguishes between instrumental and consumptive objects. 
An instrumental object serves to produce a material or social effect; 
consumptive objects serve to produce subjective-functional effects of 
enjoyment. A hammer is an instrumental object; a cigarette is a 
consumption object (Boesch, 1991, p. 194) 
Generally speaking, an instrumental object is an object which is primarily 
intended to physically enable practice (e.g., money), while a consumptive 
object, which affects the subjective state of the person, is either an object of 
personal meaning or one which satisfies desires (e.g., aesthetic objects). Like 
Baltes’ approach, Symbolic Action Theory brings to the foreground the 
enabling dimension of the cultural psychological approach. But Boesch adds a 
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more subtle distinction of the ends of action, recognising that some resources 
are ends in themselves (i.e., consumptive resources). Thus we can see that 
not all resources are used for compensation, some are used for satisfaction. 
Boesch (1991) presents the distinction between instrumental and 
consumptive resources with an important caveat. Food may at times be 
instrumental, in the sense of being used for survival, but it is often aesthetic, 
and much of the time it is a combination of both. Equally, while hammers are 
generally used for instrumental ends, children have been known to use them 
to explore acoustic and destructive aesthetics. The key point is that “the same 
object can be consumptive or instrumental, according to the use we make of 
it” (Boesch, 1991, p. 194-5).  
A third conceptualisation of using resources has been developed by 
Cole (1996) and his colleagues. This approach borrows Wartofsky’s (1979) 
distinction between primary, secondary and tertiary artifacts. Briefly, primary 
artifacts are used for the reproduction of the species and overlap with 
Boesch’s instrumental tools. Primary artifacts include language, skills, 
mechanical tools and social organisation. Secondary artifacts are 
representations used to transmit primary artifact use. These representations 
do not pertain to abstract knowledge, but rather to a concrete ‘how-to’ 
knowledge of artifact use. Tertiary artifacts refer to the imagination and are 
thus quite different from either primary or secondary artifacts. Tertiary artifacts 
enable contemplation, reverie, aesthetic perception, planning, rehashing and 
practicing. These artifacts are derivative of praxis, echoing praxis, but the 
work of the imagination is not passive, it may mediate praxis leading to novel 
primary and secondary artifacts.  
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The distinction between primary, secondary and tertiary artifacts has 
become popular and is useful for conceptualising both the way in which 
culture is used and propagated (McDonald, Le, Higgins & Podmore, 2005). 
However, while the tripartite distinction is clear at a conceptual level, it often 
becomes messy at the point of application. For example, what sort of artifact 
is a school textbook? From the perspective of a teacher it might be a primary 
artifact for doing the work of teaching and thus surviving. But, from the 
perspective of the content, it is a secondary artifact meant to transmit cultural 
knowledge. Finally, from the perspective of a bored student it may be a basis 
for daydreaming and thus a tertiary artifact.  
This is the same point, mentioned above, that Boesch (1991) makes 
about his own distinction between instrumental and consumptive objects. The 
problem is also evident in Baltes’ distinction between natural and cultural 
resources. For example, a natural resource, such as one’s fingers or toes can 
be used as a cultural resource for counting (Ifrah, 1998). In both cases, 
creative human appropriation undermines the attempt to align resources or 
artifacts with certain uses. Resources designed for one purpose, or 
conceptualised as being for one purpose, may, in the next moment, become 
appropriated and used for a second purpose. It seems that any typology of 
resources based upon the resources themselves rather than the modes of 
use, will fail to capture these creative dynamics. Accordingly, it is essential to 
distinguish what is used from how it is used, and to focus theoretical effort on 
the latter. 
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Distinguishing tools & signs 
 
In order to theorise how resources are actually used it is necessary to 
return to an often overlooked distinction insisted upon by Vygotsky. Vygotsky 
(1997, p. 61) was very critical of the loose way in which his contemporaries 
were using the metaphor of “tool.” Specifically he criticised scholars, including 
Wundt and Dewey, for referring to language as a tool. This metaphor, he 
argued, is over-stretched and obscures the distinction between tools and 
signs. Tools and signs are similar because they are both mediators. But this 
similarity conceals a fundamental difference. 
The tool serves for conveying man’s activity to the object of his activity, 
it is directed outward, it must result in one change or another in the 
object, it is the means for man’s external activity directed toward 
subjugating nature. The sign changes nothing in the object of the 
psychological operation, it is a means of psychological action on 
behaviour, one’s own or another’s (Vygotsky, 1997, p. 62) 
Tools, according to Vygotsky, mediate our relation to the physical world, and 
signs mediate our relation to our own or other minds. It is important to note 
that Vygotsky’s distinction between tools and signs is not based on the 
cultural element itself, but upon how it is used. For example, a shovel can be 
used as a tool for digging a hole, but it can also be used as an aide-mémoire, 
that is as a sign, if it is placed by the door in order to remind oneself or 
someone else to dig a hole.  
Vygotsky’s distinction between tools and signs, although often 
overlooked, persists in a surprising way. This fundamental distinction 
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characterises the two main sub-traditions of research in cultural psychology. 
These two traditions are the activity tradition and the semiotic mediation 
tradition (Valsiner, 2007, p. 31-32). Simplifying somewhat, the activity tradition 
prefers to write about tools, and emphasises material mediators, while the 
semiotic mediation tradition prefers to write about signs, and tends to 
emphasise semiotic mediators. Let us consider these traditions in turn. 
The activity tradition emphasises the mediation of action in the world, 
focusing upon mediators with enable organisations to function (Engeström, 
1987), pole vaulters to jump (Wertsch, 1995), and cookie sellers to sell 
cookies (Rogoff, 1995). Within this tradition there has been a tendency to 
suppress Vygotsky’s distinction between tools and signs, and instead to use 
more general terms such as “artifacts” (Cole, 1996, chapter 5), “mediational 
means” (Wertsch, 1998, p. 17), and “cultural artifacts” (Gauvain, 2001, p. 
126). In these, and many other cases, there seems to be a shying away from 
the distinction between tools and signs for fear of invoking a Cartesian 
dualism between mind and matter. Accordingly, the distinction between tools 
and signs has been allowed to fade. Or, more critically, one could argue that 
inflating the terms tool, artifact or mediational means to the extent that they 
subsume the concept of sign, enables a conceptual slight of hand which 
redirects the research gaze from intra-psychological dynamics, and semiotic 
mediation, to external dynamics and tool based mediation thus side-stepping 
the problem of internalisation (Zittoun, Gillespie, Cornish & Psaltis, 2007).  
The semiotic mediation tradition has preferred to focus upon the 
semiotic mediation of thought and action. In Vygotsky’s own terminology, the 
focus is signs not tools. Accordingly, in this tradition one can find studies of 
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distanciation (Valsiner, 2003), emotional experience (Zittoun, 2006a), internal 
dialogues (Josephs, 2002; Hermans, 2002), implicit mediation (Wertsch, 
2007), and self-reflection (Gillespie, 2007a). While this research tradition 
tends to focus upon intra-psychological mediators of thought, there are also 
examples of research which examines the external mediators of thought, and 
even the transition between (Cole & Derry, 2005). The critique of this tradition 
is that it risks re-creating the Cartesian dualism between world and mind. The 
problem is that if semiotic mediation can be an intra-psychological process, 
then what ontological status does that process have vis-à-vis external forms 
of mediation?  
At this point there is no need to resolve this lingering theoretical 
debate. Our approach is more pragmatic. We want a broad understanding of 
using resources, which can transcend the culture-agency antinomy, and thus 
we need to consider the use of both tools and signs. That both forms of use 
exist is abundantly evident in the voluminous literature of both traditions. We 
need to leave theoretical problems about terminology to catch up with 
empirical observation, and we should not let sensible research get held back 
by theoretical confusion. Any comprehensive theorisation of using resources 
needs to include both tools and signs. 
 
Distinguishing mediation and reflective use 
 
While Vygotsky’s distinction between tools and signs is conceptually 
clear, there linger other distinctions in his writings which are less clear. 
Wertsch (2007) provides a subtle analysis of the different ways in which 
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Vygotsky uses the concept of mediation. According to Wertsch, two distinct 
modes of mediation can be distinguished, which he calls implicit and explicit 
mediation. Explicit mediation tends to entail mediation by external objects, 
people or signs and the mediation is often intentional and done with 
awareness (p. 180). Implicit mediation tends to be internal, semiotic and is 
rarely the object of consciousness or reflection (p. 185).  
While Wertsch is correct in calling for an analysis of mediation and in 
pointing out that Vygotsky uses the term in different ways, we suggest that he 
has identified more than two types of mediation. First, there is a distinction 
between that which is internal and external. Second, there is a distinction 
between reflective and non-reflective mediation. The problem is that these two 
distinctions can and should be dissociated. For example, one can have intra-
psychological and highly self-reflective mediation. Wertsch seems to 
recognise as much in his analysis, but he does not pursue the distinction. 
According to our analysis the distinction between tool and sign is more 
precise that the distinction between internal and external. Signs can be both 
internal and external. Signs which operate upon other minds always have an 
external dimension, otherwise they could not be communicative. Signs which 
operate upon self are often internal (e.g., self-talk) but need not be (e.g., a 
knot in a handkerchief as an aide-mémoire). Having dealt with this distinction 
above, in our discussion of tools and signs, we want to focus upon the 
distinction between non-reflective and reflective mediation. 
The distinction between non-reflective and reflective resource use has 
not only been raised by Vygotsky. The distinction is evident in the writings of 
both Swidler and Moscovici, discussed above. The distinction is also central 
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for Dewey, James and Mead who were very concerned with reflective 
consciousness, theorised in terms of I/me dynamics arising in the stream of 
thought. Reflective self awareness has often been observed in empirical 
research (Gillespie, 2007b), as has the reflective use of semiotic resources 
(Zittoun, Duveen, Gillespie, Ivinson & Psaltis, 2003).  
What is meant by the reflective use of a resource? The key issue is 
whether the resource itself or the use of the resource is in the conscious 
awareness of the actor. The non-reflective user of a resource will be focused 
upon the minutiae of the task, the ends to be achieved, or indeed, freed by 
non-reflective use, the user may be thinking about something completely 
unrelated to the task. The reflective resource user, however, forms a different 
psychological relation to the task. Their mind is focused upon the resource 
being used and the mode of use. Reflective use of a resource, whether tool or 
sign, entails distanciation from the resource and its use. Such distanciation 
necessitates a second level semiotic platform for conceptualising the resource 
and its use.  
This distinction between non-reflective and reflective resource use is 
particularly dynamic. In the course of an activity, reflective awareness of 
resource use may come and go. The reflective awareness needs to be 
temporary, because so long as the resource itself is the focus of awareness it 
is difficult to proceed with the task. Rather, the reflective phase is a moment of 
stepping out and reorganising the task such that attention can be turned back 
to doing the task, perhaps, in a new way. 
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Using resources 
 
Table 1 represents the emerging conceptualisation of using resources. 
Down the left hand side is the distinction between tools and signs. Across the 
top of the table is the distinction between mediation and reflective use. Making 
the tool/sign and mediation/reflective use distinctions orthogonal results in 
four categories: tool mediation, reflective tool use, sign mediation and 
reflective sign use. The following sub-sections explore each of these four 
possibilities. 
 
[insert Table 1 around here] 
Tool mediation 
Tool mediation concerns the non-reflective use of a resource to affect a 
change in the world, not in self or other’s relation to the world. An example is 
the way in which an experienced driver changes gear while absorbed in 
driving (Leontiev, 1979). In such an activity, the actual operation of the gear 
stick is outside of the consciousness of the driver, whose awareness is at the 
level of the action, namely slowing down or accelerating.  In such moments 
the driver is absorbed (Benson, 1993) in the activity, and the tool mediated 
activity itself is not an object of awareness. The artist, for example, in 
moments of absorption is thinking of the art to be formed and not the tools 
used in the process (McCarthy, Sullivan & Wright, 2006). In tool mediation the 
tool is a pure medium, invisibly enabling and shaping the ongoing action. 
During tool mediation, there may be reflective awareness, but it is not of the 
tool use, rather it is likely to be of the details of the action and the immediate 
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goal. For example, a driver may have reflective awareness of bends in the 
road or the goal of overtaking the car in front. But in such cases the use of the 
car as a tool remains at the level of mediation and does not enter reflective 
awareness. In Leontiev’s (1979) terminology, the use of the car as a tool 
remains at the operational level while the mind of the actor is at the molar 
level of the action being performed and the goal to be achieved. 
Reflective tool use 
If while driving the car the driver moves to change gear but finds the 
gear is stuck, then there is likely to be a shift of attention from the task being 
achieved to the means of achieving the task (i.e., the car as a resource). The 
driver may think: ‘Did I move the gear stick in the right direction?’ ‘Has this 
happened before?’ ‘Is the engine still running?’ ‘What gear am I in anyway?’ 
and so on. In this moment, the actor’s relation to the tool becomes an object 
in mind. In Leontiev’s (1979) terminology, the operation of the gears becomes 
a goal directed action. Within this reflective mode, double-loop re-
conceptualisation of the tool and the mode of use are possible. The driver 
learning to drive must make each change of gear a deliberate and conscious 
action, determined by an explicit awareness of the sound of the engine, speed 
and unfolding situation on the road. Reflective tool use is particularly dynamic. 
It is a phenomenological experience of distanciation from tool use which 
occurs momentarily against a backdrop of embeddedness within the task. 
Although it is easy to observe this phenomenological experience in oneself, it 
is difficult to gather empirical data on it as it is experienced by others.  
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Sign mediation 
Sign mediation concerns the use of signs not to effect a change in the 
world directly, but rather to alter one’s own or someone else’s relation to the 
world. Sign mediation is the mediation of mind. Examples of sign mediation of 
the mind of other include many everyday communicative contexts and 
subsume what have been called communicative resources. When someone 
says ‘I am depressed’ they are rarely making a propositional statement about 
their own being, rather they are usually trying to effect a change in their 
relation to someone else (Rorty, 1999, p. xxiv). For example, they may be 
trying to make the interlocutor more sympathetic. If such an utterance has the 
desired effect, then the interlocutor may put on some uplifting music, which 
itself would be another example of sign mediation, except this time it would be 
oriented to the mind of the person claiming depression. 
If however, the music is put on for oneself, then it would be an example 
of using music to mediate one’s own feelings and emotions (Lewis, 1982; 
Zittoun, 2007). Research on symbolic resources (Zittoun, 2006a) has directly 
addressed sign mediation of self by studying how books and films enable 
imaginary and aesthetic experiences and support emotional and identity 
regulation. This domain includes most tertiary artifacts in Cole’s terminology, 
that is artifacts which enable reverie, daydreaming, dreaming, planning and 
self-talk. What is being mediated in these examples can be anything from 
self’s future action to self’s emotional state.  
Reflective sign use 
The reflective use of sign resources to act upon the mind of others is 
more common than one might initially suspect. Anyone who learns about 
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rhetorical strategies, thinks about how to give a speech or write a letter or 
article, prepares how to tell a joke, or studies management is likely to be 
engaged in the reflective use of semiotic resources. Examples from the 
literature include young children’s selective use of argumentative strategies 
(Tartas & Muller, 2007), teenagers’ careful consumption of the right 
magazines in order to be part of a peer group (Hijmans, 2004), and 
community organisers encouraging sex workers to conceptualise their 
predicament using the discourse of workers’ rights (Cornish, 2006). 
Vygotsky’s (1978) classic example of tying a knot in a handkerchief in 
order to remember something is an example of the reflective use of a semiotic 
resource to act upon the mind of self, or more specifically, to act upon self’s 
future relation to the world. Further examples include, referring to a book on 
dream symbolism to interpret one’s dreams, referring to a book on first names 
to choose a name for a new child (Zittoun, 2004), or deciding to make an 
explicit comparison between one’s own life experience and that found in a 
novel (Zittoun, 2006b). Equally, consider tourists who deliberate which 
guidebook to buy for their travels (Zittoun, Duveen, Gillespie, Ivinson & 
Psaltis, 2003), or who choose to read novels about their destination before 
departure (Zittoun, 2006a). In these examples, the difference between signs 
and tools is underscored. The tourist reading about their destination country 
before departure is not acting upon that country, rather they are acting upon 
their own psychological relation to that country.  
 
Between mediation and reflective use 
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The distinction between tool mediation and tool use enables us to ask 
the interesting question of how, why and when mediation becomes reflective 
use and vice-versa. The literature suggests a number of reasons (Gillespie, 
2007a). The most often mentioned reason is that a rupture halts ongoing 
action and stimulates reflection. This can be the gear change producing an 
unexpected result, the choice of which coins to use to pay for a taxi (Peirce, 
1878), or unsettled times (Swidler, 1986) such as war (Zittoun, Gillespie, 
Cornish & Aveling, 2008). In these instances there is a classical rupture-
transition process in which the actor’s taken-for-granted mode of action 
breaks down and the actor has to question both the resources being used and 
their mode of use (Zittoun, 2006a). Second, reflective use can also arise due 
to overlapping or contradictory representations (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999), 
where the action orientation associated with one representation stimulates the 
alternative action orientation. Third, reflective use can be stimulated by the 
gaze of others, such as when tourists become aware of themselves as 
camera touting tourists (Gillespie, 2006). Relatedly, because when people 
speak they usually hear their own utterances, it may be that hearing their own 
utterances provides enough distance from those utterances to stimulate 
reflection upon those signs as mediators being used (Gillespie, 2007a). 
Fourth, it may be that the very efficacy of the resource stimulates awareness 
of the resource. For example, Zittoun (2006b) reports on a young man 
experiencing a difficult transition who found a novel to be a useful resource by 
active reflection upon the relations between the novel and his own life 
narrative. Finally, there are also socially sanctioned moments of creativity, 
when the traditional constraints upon action are removed. For example, play 
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(Harris, 2000), pilgrimage (Turner & Turner, 1978), tourism (Ryan & Hall, 
2001), fiction (Vygotsky, 1971), poetry (Abbey, 2007), carnivals and festivals 
provide spaces in which existing relations can be re-imagined, reversed, or 
rejected. In these liminal modes of activity alternative paths of action and 
thought are promoted, thus, potentially, stimulating novel and reflective uses 
of resources.  
The reverse movement, from reflective use to mediation, is fairly 
straightforward. Once the work of reflection is done, and the resource or its 
use has been satisfactorily re-conceptualised, then activity proceeds and the 
mind refocuses upon the details of the goal directed action, and the resource 
passes into pure mediation.  
The movement from mediation to reflective use and back again might 
enable a double-loop questioning of the activity or tool. Reflection upon the 
activity or tool entails looking from a new perspective which may lead to a 
modification of the resource or the mode of use. Returning to Leontiev’s 
(1979) example of learning to drive a car, we know that initially each action, 
such as changing gear or speed, is guided by reflective awareness and self-
monitoring. Then, by virtue of practice, these actions become automatic and 
operational, thus enabling the mind to focus less upon the mediational 
resource and more upon the action being done. In the case of sports 
professionals, the case is often more complex, because their habits of running 
or swimming, for example, often need to be made explicit before being re-
modelled (Behncke, 2005). Once reflected upon and thus regulated they can 
be modified, with the aim that these modified patterns of behaviour will settle 
back into the domain of habit.  
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Future research focusing on this transformation needs to obtain data 
on the stream of consciousness (James, 1890), as the objects in that stream 
move from embedded participation in the task to distanciation or reflection 
upon the resources being used and then back again to embedded 
participation (Valsiner, 2007). Such dynamics are difficult to observe directly. 
Talk aloud protocol, during the course of activity can be used (Valsiner, 2003; 
Wagoner & Valsiner, 2005). Microgenetic methods, which try to slow down the 
movement of thought, might also be a means for exploring the shifts in 
reflective consciousness. Alternatively, one can analyse interviews in search 
of moments of reflection and the movement of thought (e.g., Gillespie, 2006; 
Moscovici, 1974/2008, chapter 10).  
 
Between tools and signs 
 
What is a sign? And how is it different to a tool? If signs cannot act 
upon the world directly, but only upon the mind, then do they belong to a 
distinct ontological realm? If so, does this realm co-exist with the material 
realm, yielding a dualism akin to that described by Descartes? Questions 
such as these have unfortunately led to the suppression of the distinction 
between tools and signs. By making the distinction between tools and signs 
fundamental to our conceptualisation of use, we now need to address these 
difficult questions. 
The relation between tools and signs, and especially, how tools might 
become signs was of central concern for Vygotsky (Vygotsky & Luria, 1994). 
According to Cowley, Moodley and Flori-Cowley (2004), there is no 
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satisfactory way to explain how this emergence occurs. Vygotsky (1997, p. 
104) himself presented a brief analysis of pointing, which is meant to illustrate 
how pointing-for-reaching becomes pointing-for-communicating (i.e., a sign). 
But his analysis is too brief to reveal a mature theory (Zittoun et al., 2007). 
While no conclusive statement can be provided on the way in which tools 
become signs, and vice-versa, we want to outline briefly how a Meadian 
perspective might aid future research in addressing this important question. 
According to Mead (1922; Gillespie, 2005) between tool use and sign 
use is an intermediate form of social action. This intermediate form is only 
conceivable when we take a perspectival view on the social world (Mead, 
1932). Beginning with direct action on the world Mead points out that although 
this action is directed at the world by the actor, it may have meaning for an 
observer. That is to say, the action may have two different meanings from the 
two perspectives. In relation to the actor, the action is directed at the material 
world. But in relation to the observer, the action becomes a symbolic index of 
consequence. Such action Mead described as symbolic, and differentiated it 
from significant symbolic action. Symbolic action is action that is mean is 
meaningful to an observer in some way that the actor is unaware. Consider a 
driver who pulls out onto a street unaware that they have just cut off a 
bicyclist, who narrowly escapes an accident. The driver, in such a situation, is 
embedded in the task of driving and unaware that their actions have the 
meaning of being ‘incompetent’, ‘aggressive,’ or ‘dangerous’ from the 
perspective of the bicyclist. The driving is symbolic for the bicyclist but not for 
the driver. Significant symbolic action, on the other hand, is communication 
proper, where the actor is aware of the impression an action creates in the 
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mind of an observer, and thus uses the action to affect the mind of the 
observer deliberately. For example, wearing a smart suit in the knowledge 
that other people will think it smart, or speaking to people in full knowledge of 
what one is saying. 
Consider the following more elaborate example. John lives on a street 
with a lot of rubbish and he has been trying to arrange for local residents to 
have a day of street cleaning, but he has met with little success. Then, giving 
up on his neighbours, John goes out to begin cleaning up the rubbish himself. 
He uses a bag and shovel as his tools for acting directly on the world. 
However, as he is working he notices that his neighbours are looking at him 
from between the curtains, and he can imagine their shame for not helping. In 
order to encourage these feelings and possibly stimulate his neighbours to 
help, John continues cleaning rubbish late into the night. Although the 
ongoing behaviour is the same, the bag and shovel have become signs – 
signs of his working, and he is using them to affect the mind of his 
neighbours. In this case although the action (cleaning) remains constant, the 
action moves from tool use to sign use. However, just because John is trying 
to communicate shame with his labour, it does not follow that he will be 
successful. If we look at the situation from the perspective of his neighbours, 
then in one house we might find a family who thinks John is wasting his time 
because the council is scheduled to come and do the cleaning tomorrow, and 
in another house we might find people who see John’s behaviour as 
sanctimonious, self-righteous and holier-than-thou. In so far as John’s 
neighbours feel guilt, then his action is significantly symbolic, but in so far as 
his neighbours perceive alternative meanings, then his action is only 
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symbolic. If John were to become aware of these alternative meanings, then 
his action would become increasingly significantly symbolic, and he might 
even cease the cleaning. 
Incorporating Mead’s distinction between symbolic and significant 
symbolic action into our present scheme means recognising symbolic action 
(in Mead’s terminology not in the terminology of Symbolic Action Theory) as 
an intermediary between action and significant symbolic action (or sign use). 
This intermediary is important because it defies the idea of a Cartesian 
dualism. In symbolic action we find half a sign process, and it is not half way 
to being a different kind of ontological stuff. Rather, it remains partial because 
the perspective which links the actor to the object is not integrated with the 
perspective which links the other to the actor’s action. The actor’s action is 
meaningful to the other, but the actor is not aware of this meaning and thus is 
not in control of the sign process. Significant symbolic action entails the actor 
being aware of the meaning of their action from the perspective of the 
observer. Thus, instead of moving between ontological realms, a Meadian 
conception entails only a movement between perspectives.  
 
Considerations for the future 
 
That the social sciences in general and cultural psychology in particular 
are fragmented fields of research has often been observed (Valsiner, 2007; 
Witherington, 2007). One area of particular heterogeneity, overlap and 
polysemy, we have argued, concerns the idea of using resources. Our aim, in 
the present article, has been to review the main concepts being used and to 
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tentatively draw out the distinctions between tool and sign, and between 
mediation and reflective use. 
Unlike many of the distinctions reviewed, the distinctions we have 
emphasised concern the uses of resources, not resources used. Accordingly, 
the same resource can appear in any of the four modes of use. Consider 
again the case of the shovel. While absorbed in digging, the shovel is a 
mediational tool. If the shovel breaks, or causes trouble, it may stimulate 
reflective use. If the hole is not dug before the end of day, the digger may 
choose to leave the shovel in a notable place, either as an aide-mémoire for 
the morning or as a reminder for a second person to make a contribution. 
Finally, the shovel may be incorporated in reflective semiotic use if, for 
example, it gets selected by a stage designer who is looking for a shovel as a 
stage prop that will create a very particular aura on stage. Thus, in the present 
scheme, a shovel cannot be categorised absolutely, rather we need to focus 
upon an instance of use to be able to categorise it. 
The two distinctions which we propose are not meant to be a final 
integrative statement. Rather, these distinctions are put forward as an attempt 
to review and take stock. In that spirit, we want to conclude our stock-taking 
by considering a number of problematic issues which will need to be 
considered in future theorising.  
First, many instances of tool use are highly semiotic. Driving a car, 
even if absorbed in the act of driving, is a highly semiotic activity. There are 
road signs which mediate behaviour. Even the behaviour of other drivers and 
pedestrians become signs (or more specifically, using Mead’s terminology, 
symbols) which mediate the behaviour of the driver. Does this mean that 
 31 
driving is not tool use? In order to deal with this problem, we need to be very 
clear about what is in whose mind. The road sign is a semiotic mediator but 
the driver is not the one who is using the sign communicatively. The local 
council which installed the road sign has reflectively used the sign as a sign 
mediator of drivers’ behaviour. The driver uses the sign as indicative of an 
emerging road. The driver uses knowledge to interpret road signs. This mode 
of use is usually non-reflective sign mediation. To the extent that the driver is 
interpreting signs, we are dealing with sign mediation. But the car itself is not 
being used to interpret the signs, rather it is simply being used as a tool. But, 
of course, this is not to say that the car cannot be a sign. Indeed, any driver 
who pays attention to the appearance of their car is concerned with it as a 
sign. The point, however, is that to distinguish tools and signs means focusing 
on the micro details of the here-and-now context, and who is using what and 
how.   
Second, the distinction between mediation and reflective use can also 
become messy in practice. Consider using a mirror, is it reflective use? 
Although the mirror might stimulate self-reflection, this is not necessarily 
reflection about the use of the mirror. It is important not to confuse self-
reflection in general with reflective use of resources. The question to ask in 
each situation is: What is the object in the mind of the actor? Reflective use 
entails having the resource or its use as an object in mind. Non-reflective use 
entails the actor being aware of something else. 
Third, in cases where there is sign mediation directed at an 
interlocutor, that is, non-reflective use, it can be difficult to know whether we 
are dealing with ‘use’ by the actor or ‘perception’ by the interlocutor. Consider 
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the case of boys interacting with girls to solve a task and using a masculine 
argumentative style to gain influence (Psaltis & Duveen, 2006). Is the 
argumentative style being ‘used’ by the boys or is it being ‘perceived’ by the 
girls? If, as suggested by Mead, creating an impression in the mind of the 
other is the first step in the creation of a sign, then can one say that creating 
such an impression is actually a case of sign mediation or communication? In 
Vygotsky’s (1997) example of the baby grasping, which the mother interprets 
as pointing, is the baby engaged in sign mediation of the mind of the mother, 
or is the mother using the babies grasping as a semiotic index of the child’s 
desires?  
Fourth, there are also situations in which an actor assumes that they 
are using signs to create a specific meaning in the mind of an other, but, like 
in the case of John, the meaning received, or the impression created, is quite 
different to that which is expected. In such situations the actor is using a sign, 
in so far as they are intentionally communicating. However, the action or 
communication is a symbolic index or cue for the interlocutors who find a 
different meaning. One could call this extra or unintended meaning that is 
created in the minds of observers surplus meaning (Gillespie, 2003), and 
arguably in so far as the actor can become aware of this surplus meaning, 
then we are witnessing the movement from action, to symbol to significant 
symbol. But in order to fully capture the dynamics of this surplus meaning in 
an analysis one has to consider each communicative act from the various 
perspectives. Table 1 presents the act of use only from the perspective of the 
actor. 
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Fifth, the study of using resources must be aware of the psychologist’s 
fallacy (James, 1890). Namely, we must be careful to distinguish what is in 
the mind of actors from what is in the mind of researchers. Table 1 
suppresses the multi-perspective nature of social life. Any time that these 
categorisations are used in the context of research there are at a minimum 
two perspectives, namely, the perspective of the researched and the 
perspective of the researcher. These two perspectives are evident in the table 
in the following way. When talking about reflective use, the frame of reference 
is the phenomenological perspective of the researched. Reflective use means 
that the resource is an object in the mind of the actor. Mediation, on the other 
hand, is not in the conscious mind of the researched. It only exists 
consciously for the researcher forming an interpretation. Mediation is 
something that the researcher sees in the activity analysed. 
These two perspectives pave the way for further complexity. Consider 
the case of a man uttering a prayer in an attempt to influence the lottery 
numbers. From the perspective of the actor, the prayer is being used to act 
upon the world (the number generator), and as such, the prayer is being used 
as a tool. But, from the perspective of a researcher who is sceptical about the 
efficacy of prayer in such a context, the use of prayer might seem to have a 
different function. Maybe the researcher interprets the use of prayer as a 
means to maintain emotional security, to create feelings of control, or as a 
means of wish fulfilment. In such cases the prayer is a semiotic resource, or 
symbolic resource, being used non-reflectively to mediate the actor’s own 
emotional state. Thus, the research might argue for the prayer as having a 
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latent function. How can we include such divergent perspectives in future 
theory? 
Thus we conclude our article with more questions than answers. While 
we have tried to review and consolidate our conceptualisation of using 
resources, it is clear that the task of theorising our relation to culture is not 
finished. We hope that these concluding concerns will sensitise future 
theoretical and empirical research. 
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Table 1: Conceptualising the use of resources 
 
   
Use 
 
  Mediation  
(mind is focused upon the goal 
not the mediational means) 
 
Reflective use 
(mind is focused upon the 
resource and its use) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resources 
 
 
Tools 
(acting on the 
world) 
 
Tool mediation 
- Being absorbed in any action 
directed at the world 
 
Examples:  
- Driving, building, fixing, 
digging, or eating etc. 
 
 
Reflective tool use 
- Reflecting upon tool 
mediation 
 
Examples:  
- Changing tool, fixing a tool, 
or learning to use a tool etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Signs 
 (acting on 
mind of self or 
other) 
 
 
 
Sign mediation 
- Absorbed in action that is 
mediated by signs 
 
Examples: 
- Habitual use of discourse or 
imagery to communicate 
- Talking oneself or someone 
else through a task 
- Intra-psychological planning 
to go on holiday 
- Dreaming, reverie, aesthetic 
appreciation 
 
 
Reflective sign use 
- Thinking about the signs 
that are mediating action 
 
Examples: 
- Choosing what clothes to 
wear for an interview 
- The poet deliberating over a 
choice of words 
- Deciding to tie a knot in a 
handkerchief to remember 
something 
- Choosing to listen to some 
calming music when stressed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
